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Abstract: In this paper we present a detailed surveillance strategy concept for a Rail Collision 
Avoidance System (RCAS) that is based on direct train-to-train communication. Similar to 
existing systems in air and maritime transport, the RCAS approach allows vehicle 
autonomous detection of imminent collisions. Designed as a safety overlay system, it shall 
warn and advise train drivers in such situations. Apart from an onboard localization unit, 
which relies on satellite navigation signals, the system architecture does not require any other 
infrastructure. We will define the content of the broadcasted messages, which shall allow each 
railway vehicle to assess the traffic situation in its vicinity under all operational conditions. A 
variable transmission rate of messages ensures both, timely warning and an efficient use of 
communication channel resources in different scenarios like e.g. on regional network lines or 
in large shunt yards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Actual statistics of the International Union of Railways (UIC) show that there are three 
significant train accidents in Europe every day [1], despite of millions of Euros which have 
been invested in trackside and in-train safety equipment. Most of the catastrophes in railroad 
transport are caused by collisions as illustrated in Figure 1. Today, only the operation center 
has an overall overview of the traffic situation, and a train driver has to be informed of a 
hypothetical collision by the operation center staff.  
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Figure 1: Causes for railroad catastrophes worldwide between 1971 and 2005 
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Figure 2: Rail construction vehicle as potential collision threat 
 
Even with Automatic Train Control (ATC) systems like the future European Train Control 
System (ETCS) a significant amount of collisions cannot be prevented, because they occur 
between trains and other kinds of obstacles like construction vehicles (see Figure 2), 
construction workers or pedestrians and vehicles on level crossings. 
VEHICLE AUTONOMOUS COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
While maritime, air, and road transport have a vehicle integrated collision avoidance system 
available or in the development phase [2], there is no satisfying solution of this type of 
technology in railway transportation. Usually such systems rely on position determination and 
direct communication among vehicles. Alike we propose a Rail Collision Avoidance System 
(RCAS), that operates autonomous.  
For this purpose each railroad vehicle shall be equipped with onboard sensors that provide 
updated Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) information. PVT and additional data is then 
regularly broadcasted to all other RCAS equipped units in the surrounding. By analyzing the 
received messages from other units the complete traffic situation can be assessed, thereby 
allowing the warning and advising of a train driver in case of a collision threat, long before 
the danger is visible and early enough to completely avoid it. Since braking distances of trains 
can be several kilometers long, a sufficient range for the direct train-to-train communications 
link is required. Moreover a reliable message transmission must be guaranteed in all the 
different scenarios within a railway network.  
In principle, the RCAS approach is very similar to TCAS/ADS-B [3] (Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System / Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast) used as a 
“safety overlay system” in aeronautical transport, which is as well controlled by a number of 
operation centers. The advantages of such infrastructure-less vehicle autonomous collision 
avoidance system are: 
• Additional safety which is independent of the regular traffic control mechanisms. 
• System works independently of the nature of fail operation. 
• Only one properly working communication link is needed. 
• No changes are required on the existing infrastructure. 
• Lower costs compared to infrastructure based systems; the onboard unit price is 
marginal compared to the vehicle price. 
• Continuous “roll-out” is possible; safety increases with number of units. 
• Potential to increase efficiency in the future, e.g. shorter distances between following 
vehicles. 
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Railway specific boundary conditions 
 
While the principle of infrastructure-less vehicle autonomous collision avoidance is well 
established in aeronautics, as well as it is the case in maritime transport with the AIS 
(Automatic Identification System), none of the existing systems is applicable to railway 
transport, because of its very specific boundary conditions: 
 
1. Movement patterns are highly deterministic because of the guidance by the rails. In 
conflict situations a train driver can only break or accelerate. The switches are 
controlled by the railway control centre only. 
2. Movement vectors which are in line can also occur in nominal conditions e.g. when 
trains are coupled or when one train overtakes another one on a double track line. 
Moreover, the tracks are very close, which requires highly accurate position 
determination. 
3. Punctually there are very high user densities in a railway network like e.g. at large 
shunting yards. Because the available frequency band is limited, in such areas the 
resulting high data rate must not degrade the reliability of message transmission.  
4. Lines are sometimes under ground (tunnels), under roofs in train stations or they pass 
through dense forests and hilly areas. Such topological scenarios are challenging with 
respect to the required range of the direct train-to-train communication as well as for 
GNSS satellite signal reception. 
THE RAILWAY COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM – RCAS 
The above listed railway specific boundary conditions require new design considerations for 
the three major components of an infrastructure-less collision avoidance system for trains 
illustrated in Figure 3. In this paper the focus lies on the surveillance strategy and the 
resolution concept in case of a conflict. Nevertheless this implies stringent requirements to 
aspects of the communications link, like the message rate and - according to the broadcasted 
information - the message length.   
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Figure 3: Major components of an infrastructure-less collision avoidance system for trains 
 
Operational scenarios 
 
In railroad transport well-defined collision scenarios can be distinguished in different modes 
of operation. In Figure 4 the situation is illustrated for a head-on, a rear-end and a flank 
collision scenario. In terms of requirements on the train-to-train communications link - 
especially on the range and the message repetition rate, the first one is the most demanding, 
since the remaining braking distances decrease for both trains according to their momentary 
speed. 
In addition to these pure train collision scenarios many more collision threats are addressed 
with the RCAS approach. First of all, any railway carriage or vehicle shall be equipped with 
an RCAS transceiver. This way incidents during shunting, but also accidents with e.g. 
construction vehicles can be prevented. Also construction workers can be warned of 
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Figure 4: Head-on, rear-end and flank collision scenarios in railroad transportation 
 
approaching trains if they carry handheld-sized units. With additional onboard sensors 
mudflow, fallen rocks, animals or disrooted trees on the track and broken branches on the 
catenary can be automatically reported to nearby trains. Even overlapping cargo due to 
displacement can be detected. 
A significant number of collisions occur at level crossings. Here a stationary RCAS unit that 
surveys the road and interfaces the future C2C (car-to-car) communication system can 
forewarn both, train and car drivers. 
 
Topological scenarios 
 
The topological scenarios describe the different parts of the whole railway network. In a first 
analysis published in [4] we investigated the different topological scenarios in railroad 
transport and identified  
 
• regional lines, 
• train stations 
• and shunting yards 
 
as those scenarios which are relevant for the RCAS system design. Main lines with high speed 
services are not considered, because there the safety level is already very high due to 
extensive technical equipment and train control mechanisms. 
For the listed scenarios the maximum speed is 160 km/h. In case of emergency braking the 
maximum braking distances are in the order of 1 km. Depending on the weather and rail 
conditions this can increase due to reduced fraction. Moreover, to allow for a secure (non 
passenger imperilling) braking of fast passenger trains, more than 2 km are necessary with the 
corresponding brake configuration. For the head-on collision scenario this means we need to 
guarantee a communication range of at least 5 km and need to have a high message repetition 
rate to loose a minimum of braking distance when the two trains approach the communication 
range.  
More constraints arise from the high rail vehicle densities in large shunting yards. For 
instance in Maschen near Hamburg, at the second largest shunting yard in the world, several 
hundred trains with more than 4000 freight carriages are handled per day. Due to regulatory 
issues the transmit power and bandwidth in the envisaged frequency band around 460 MHz, 
which is dedicated to railway applications, is limited. Thus we face a strong limit on the data 
rate, which means we have to use the message bits economically and we need to minimize the 
message rate. This is contradictory to the head-on collision scenario of two fast passenger 
trains, where we want to detect the threat as early as possible. The solution is to adapt the 
message rate, as we will describe later in this paper. 
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System architecture 
 
On board of each rail vehicle an intelligent RCAS unit is foreseen, comprising a transceiver 
and a processor unit as illustrated in Figure 5. For accurate track resolving localization, a 
combination of GNSS receiver, odometer and eddy current sensor can be used [5]. The last 
one not only improves the accuracy along the track by detecting rail clamps, but also allows 
identification of switches and the switch stand by unique signatures. Aided by an electronic 
map this guarantees precise PVT information even in tunnels, under roofs of train stations and 
in shunting yards.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: RCAS system unit architecture 
 
In order to avoid collisions by overlapping cargo, to survey the catenary and the track, or to 
monitor the end of the train, a camera can be installed and connected to provide additional 
safety relevant information. Furthermore, an interface to an electronic schedule like the 
German EBuLa can give information on the planned route and speed of the train. In the future 
ETCS will even support online updates on this data. 
The core of the system is an algorithm analyzing the received information from other trains 
together with the PVT and train data of its own carrier. Thus it allows to advise the train 
driver against a potential collision, or even to initiate braking to avoid it. 
 
Surveillance strategy 
 
Broadcasted information 
 
Each RCAS unit produces messages with a fixed length. These messages are transmitted with 
a variable rate in a broadcast mode depending on the own speed and the traffic situation in the 
vicinity. The proposed RCAS message format is shown in Figure 6. The net size is 152 bits. 
First of all the message type indicates the format of the Position and Route Information (PRI) 
block. If there is a track selective position information present, the track ID, the distance from 
the tracks starting node, the movement direction and, if available, the information on the 
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Figure 6: Description of the proposed RCAS message format  
 
planned route are transmitted. Alternatively latitude, longitude and heading are broadcasted. 
Another message type (not depicted in Figure 6) enables warning of other trains in case of 
track damage or blockage by replacing the planned route or heading information in the PRI 
block with an identifier for the type of threat, which is linked to the transmitted location. This 
same message type is also used to broadcast the identified collision point in case that TA is 
activated due to a conflict with another RCAS unit.   
The train ID includes information about its operator, the type of train or vehicle and its danger 
status. The type of train information enables prioritisation of e.g. a passenger train that passes 
a shunting area. The danger status can be used to notify others of an extended loading gauge 
or if dangerous goods are carried. 
The current speed, an estimate of the braking distance, and the forward and backward length 
of the train with respect to the localization unit are included in the message to allow other 
trains to identify potential collision points and to determine where and when warnings and 
braking advisories must be initiated. 
Included in the message is also the actual message broadcast rate and information regarding 
the MAC (Media Access Control) scheme for the communication channel. Due to the 
relatively fast movement of trains and the challenging propagation conditions, no existing 
MAC protocol is appropriate for the RCAS system. A possible solution is developed and 
presented in [6]. 
 
Reliable collision detection 
 
The most important property of a collision avoidance system is its reliability in detecting 
collisions in time. Moreover we must guarantee that regular operation conditions do not lead 
to warnings, because this would slow down train runs. Moreover, regular false alarms would 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Contingency table for a collision detection algorithm  
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cause train drivers’ to mistrust the system and eventually to ignore it. That means we have to 
minimize missed alarms (false positive) and minimize false alarms (true negative) as 
illustrated in the contingency table in Figure 7. This goal is particularly difficult to achieve in 
railway transportation. Imagine a single track line with a passing point at a small station, 
where two railcars are approaching, or one has already stopped in the station. 
In order to distinguish collision scenarios from regular operation, it is very helpful to look at 
the estimated braking distances. In regular operation there is always enough margin to allow 
for a dosed braking. Thus, if the distance to another train on the same route approaches the 
sum of the braking capability limits of both trains, the RCAS system shall act. 
 
Alert and advisory (command) concept 
 
Because of the relatively high speeds of trains and the long braking distances, an alert and 
advisory (or command) concept, similar to the aeronautical TCAS, promises a major safety 
gain. In the first step a Traffic Alert (TA) signal shall warn the train driver in case of a 
detected close approach to another RCAS unit on a collision course. TA will be activated with 
a fixed time Alertt  prior to the time when the train has to start braking, given that it proceeds 
with the momentary speed. Thus, the train driver is prepared to receive a Braking Command 
(BC) in a second step, which is signaled after Alertt  seconds in order to avoid the collision. As 
an example Figure 8 illustrates this concept for the front collision scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Illustration of Traffic Alert (TA) and Braking Command (BC) concept 
 
The distance between TA and BC is given by ( )Alert AlertD v v t= ⋅ . To allow for a safe braking, 
a guard distance ( )GuardD v  is added to the braking distance ( )BrakeD v  to assure that the trains 
come to a full stop under all environmental conditions. 
A very similar situation is given, if a rear-end collision scenario is detected. In this case the 
length of the leading train has to be taken into account and only the following train will 
receive a braking command until its speed allows a safe follow up. To expand the TA-BC 
concept to fit flank collision scenarios, the following definitions are made: 
 
 Definition TA 
– Current speeds of two trains lead to a collision or „close collision“ (virtual 
lead-lag time  corresponding to a lead-lag range lt l lD v t= ⋅ ) on the planned 
route and 
– distance to BC point ( )AlertD v≤  
 
 Definition BC  
– TA active and 
– distance to (possible) collision point ( ) ( )Brake GuardD v D v≤ +  
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The virtual lead-lag time  induces extra margins between trains that approach a crossing or a 
switch, even in the case that no flank collision would occur if they proceed with the same 
speed. But if one of the trains changes its speed this margin must allow the other one to react 
to the changed traffic situation. In this way safe and efficient transport can be achieved. 
lt
 
The braking distance of each train mainly depends on the following parameters: Speed, slope 
of the track, brake type, brake configuration, number of axels, and ratio braking weight to 
train weight. While the track slope is provided by the electronic map, all other parameters are 
train or vehicle specific parameters which are either pre-assigned or they can be determined 
by sensors.  
An estimate of the braking distance Bs  can be calculated with e.g. the Mindener equation [7] 
 
2
0
1 2
3,85
6,1 (1 /10)B m
vs
c cψ λ= + + i ,                                               (1) 
 
where  is the speed at the start of braking, 0v ψ ,  and  are higher order function of  
which depend on the brake type, brake configuration and number of axels, is the mean 
slope of the track, and
1c 2c 0v
mi
λ is the ratio braking weight to train weight. Equation (1) is valid for 
passenger trains only. For a modified version of (1) addressing freight trains and for more 
details on the parameters we refer to [7]. To calculate the total braking distance  we 
need to add the distance depending on the reaction time  of the train driver  
BrakeD
Reactt
 
Brake React BD v t s= ⋅ + .                                                      (2) 
 
Although such calculations can provide good estimates and one can even think of expanding 
the model to take e.g. aging of brakes into account, the real braking distance might vary due 
to the fact that adhesion and friction between wheels and rails are changing depending on the 
environmental conditions, which are difficult to be quantified. In order to minimize false 
alarms in regular operation conditions and to efficiently use the track infrastructure, the 
braking distance shall not be overestimated. On the other hand, an underestimation of the 
braking distance would cause collisions at low speed. Therefore we propose to add a guard 
distance  as depicted in GuardD Figure 8, which is a second order function of the momentary 
speed 
2
0 1 2GuardD k k v k v= + + .                                                   (3) 
 
This provides enough margin at high speeds but also allows short distances between trains at 
low speed. In the RCAS algorithm the traffic situation will be assessed repeatedly, thereby 
taking velocity changes into account. In the future, if we think of an RCAS controlled brake, 
this would also enable to specify the distance between vehicles when they come to a stop. In 
the case that we set 0 0k = , this would allow for automatic coupling. 
 
Under the assumption, that all involved vehicles are aware of the critical situation, that means 
we can guarantee that the communication range  is larger than the sum of the total 
braking distances (see 
CommD
Figure 8), we can further assume, that all train drivers will follow a BC. 
That means each involved vehicle is able to determine a common point on the track (crash 
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symbol in Figure 8), where it must come to a full stop. This finally leads to the absolute 
points on the track for TA and BC signaling. 
 
Besides the alert and advisory/command concept which is apparent to the train drivers, the 
RCAS collision detection algorithm internally uses a 5 step classification process to improve 
performance: 
 
1. “listening” – as long as there are no messages received, 
2. “awareness” – if another RCAS unit is within the communication range on a route 
that does not cause a conflict, 
3. “surveillance” – if the possible routes of the trains and their speeds lead to a contact 
or close contact, i.e. they might pass the same switch or track, or they pass on a 
parallel track, 
4. “warning” – when TA is active, 
5. “braking” – when BC is active. 
 
Depending on the status, distance and speed of the other user, the conflict potential is assessed 
at different rates.   
 
Adaptive message broadcast rate 
 
Similar to the adaptive internal processing rate, the broadcast rate of messages is adapted to 
efficiently use the allocated frequency band. This is especially important in dense areas near 
large shunting yards, where we meet hard limits on the total system data rate. It is not only 
required to guarantee the necessary data throughput on the communications channel. Most 
important is to minimize the latency times for receiving updated information from other trains. 
 
In the following we will derive a formula for the necessary message broadcast rate, which is 
once more dependent on the actual speed and the braking distance and which takes worst case 
assumptions for a train just entering the communications range in a front collision scenario 
into account. According to Figure 8 the total distance between the hypothetical collision point 
and the TA point for train A is given by 
 
, , ,Total A Guard A Brake A Alert AD D D D= + + , ,                                        (4) 
 
where ,Brake AD  and  are calculated from (2) and (3) using the momentary speed ,Guard AD Av  of 
train A. In the second section of this chapter on page 4, where we investigated the different 
topological scenarios, we concluded that the required communication range = 5 km. 
Under worst case assumptions a train B travels at the maximum speed  = 160 km/h in 
the regional network and requires a maximum braking distance because adhesion is reduced 
and the slope is negative. In fact this would mean the driver is going faster than allowed. 
Adding some minimum alert margin to the braking distance, this should never exceed half the 
communication range. Thus the total distance between the hypothetical collision point and the 
TA point for train B is maximal  
CommD
,maxBv
 
 , ,max 2
Comm
Total B
DD = = 2500 m.                                                 (5)                        
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Now, if we assume that train B is unknown and just enters the communication range, we can 
calculate the minimal required message broadcast rate  for train A to notify train B in 
time with a specified probability : 
,minAR
tP
 
 
,max
,min
, , ,
( )
tP B A
A
Comm Total A Total B
n v v
R
D D D max
+= − −  .                                          (6) 
 
The denominator in (6) is the sum of the remaining distances which A and B are in front of 
their TA points. Multiplied by ,max( )B Av v+  this gives the reciprocal value of the time left to 
reach these points. Neglecting the propagation delay this is finally multiplied by the number 
of repeated transmissions , which are necessary to ensure the reception of at least one 
message with a probability . 
tP
n
tP
The number of necessary repeated transmissions  mainly depends on the propagation 
conditions and on the user density, respectively on the implemented MAC protocol as 
explicated in [6]. First analysis of promising new MAC protocols for high dynamic Mobile 
Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) in dense user areas using the channel model presented in [8] 
indicate, that a probability in the order of 
tP
n
51 10tP
−= −  is achievable with 51 10 10n −− <  
transmissions even under such demanding conditions. The details of this analysis would by 
far exceed the content of this paper and will be published separately in the near future. 
 
For the next step let us assume that 51 10tP
−= −  under such extreme conditions is sufficient 
for the overall performance of the system and that 51 10 7n −− = . In case that train A is at a stop, 
(6) allows us to calculate the minimal required message broadcast rate of the complete system 
 
min
7 (44.4 m/s 0 m/s) 0.125Hz
5000 m 0 m 2500 m
R ⋅ += − − = .                                   (7) 
   
On the other hand, we need to set an upper limit due to communication channel resource 
limitations.  A reasonable value is max 2HzR = . This meets the processing performance limits 
of the collision detection algorithm in first tests and leads to acceptable short delays in 
updating the changes in the traffic situation. 
Equation (6) allows us to calculate the required broadcast rate depending on the momentary 
speed. Advantages for the investigated MAC protocols is a stepwise change like 
. Thus the result of (6) must be rounded to the next higher of 
these values. In this way slot reservation is possible (see message format details in 
0.125 / 0.25 / 0.5 /1/ 2HzR =
Figure 6), 
which reduces message collisions. 
If another train C is detected to cause a conflict, i.e. the status is “surveillance”, “warning” 
or “braking”, the rate will be further increased step by step. 
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper we presented a reliable surveillance strategy concept for an efficient and robust 
train control overlay system exploiting direct train-to-train communications. The content of 
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the broadcasted messages allows each railway vehicle to assess the traffic situation in its 
vicinity. The variable broadcast rate of messages enables to get by with the limited 
communication channel resources in the envisaged internationally available frequency band 
under all operational conditions and in the different railway scenarios like regional networks 
or large shunt yards.  
The presented surveillance strategy provides instant information to train engine drivers in case 
of imminent collisions and many other threats on railroads that cause most of the accidents 
today. At the same time it allows for a more efficient use of rail infrastructure in the future. 
The advantages of this infrastructure-less approach are fast and relatively cheap deployment. 
Moreover a continuous roll-out is possible without the need to take a hand in existing train 
control mechanisms.  
One of the next steps in our research is the verification of the propagation channel model 
through measurements. Together with real network and train schedule data this will allow us 
to perform detailed simulations of the new MAC layer approaches. Especially the distribution 
of latency times in receiving updated traffic information is important to evaluate the reliability 
of the direct train-to-train communication link.  
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